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ANOTHER DEFENCE OF OWENS’S EXCLUSIVITY 
OBJECTION TO BELIEFS HAVING AIMS  
 
Ema SULLIVAN-BISSETT 
Paul NOORDHOF 
ABSTRACT: David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the 
grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on 
aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim 
of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn 
Steglich-Petersen responded to this objection by appeal to other deliberative 
contexts in which the aim could be weighed, and we argued that this 
response to Owens failed for two reasons. Steglich-Petersen has since 
responded to our defence of Owens’s objection. Here we reply to Steglich-
Petersen and conclude, once again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim 
approach remains to be answered.  
 
1. Common ground  
Let us identify the common ground from which we and Steglich-Petersen 
begin. First, it is a necessary condition on aims that they are weighable.1 
Second, doxastic deliberation (deliberation over whether to believe that p) 
exhibits exclusivity to truth considerations2 (indeed, Steglich-Petersen 3 has 
also appealed to the aim of belief in explaining why this is so). The putative 
aim of belief then is not weighable in the context of doxastic deliberation. On 
these two points, all parties agree.  
1 To our knowledge, of all the responses to Owens’s objection, no one has taken issue with 
this condition on aims.  
2 Conor McHugh has responded to Owens’s objection by denying that deliberation over what 
to believe involves exclusivity to truth considerations, and thus the aim of belief can indeed 
be weighed, in that very context (McHugh, Conor 2013: ‘The Illusion of Exclusivity’. European 
Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 23, pp. 1117–36). We also think this response to Owens is 
unsuccessful (see Archer, Sophie 2015: ‘Exclusivity Defended’. Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12268; and Sullivan-Bissett, Ema forthcoming: 
‘Aims and Exclusivity’. European Journal of Philosophy.  
3  Steglich–Petersen, Asbjørn 2008: ‘Does Doxastic Transparency Support Evidentialism?’ 
Dialectica, Vol. 62, no. 4, pp. 541–47, p. 546. 1  
                                                        
 2. Steglich-Petersen’s reply (20094) to Owens (20035) 
In reply, Steglich-Petersen identified other deliberative contexts in which the 
truth-aim can be weighed. He gave examples of the truth-aim being 
weighable insofar as it can be discarded in the context of deliberation over 
whether to form a belief about p (that is, whether to enter doxastic deliberation 
over whether p). Considerations speaking in favour of discarding the truth-aim 
and not forming a belief about whether p might be ones relating to the 
cognitive resources one is willing or able to devote to the task, or the 
consequences which might follow from forming a belief about p.  
 
3. Our response (20136)  
In response we made two points. First, in the cases Steglich-Petersen 
discusses, we should not say that the agents weigh the truth-aim and discard 
it in favour of other considerations, rather, the truth-aim does not require 
consideration. This is because agents are not required by the truth-aim to form 
beliefs, rather, it is only that if that is what an agent is up to, then the beliefs 
which she comes to have had better be true ones. This was captured by 
Owens’s formulation of the truth-aim in terms of truth being a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition for forming a belief that p. 
Second, Steglich-Petersen equivocates over deliberating over whether to form 
a belief about p, and deliberating over whether to believe that p. In the former 
context, there is no adoption of the truth-aim. If an agent decides not to form a 
belief about p, Steglich-Petersen claims that she discards the truth-aim. But this 
is incorrect. Rather, the decision not to form a belief about p has been informed 
by a cognitive process prior to that of belief formation. The agent has not 
already adopted the truth-aim for p, and so is not weighing one aim against 
4 Steglich-Petersen, Asbjørn 2009: ‘Weighing the Aim of Belief’. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 145, 
pp. 395–405. 
5 Owens, David 2003: ‘Does Belief Have an Aim?’ Philosophical Studies. Vol. 115, pp. 283–305.  
6 Sullivan-Bissett, Ema and Noordhof, Paul 2013: ‘A Defence of Owens’ Exclusivity Objection 
to Beliefs Having Aims’. Philosophical Studies. Vol. 163, pp. 453–7.  2  
                                                        
another. Truth is only a constraint upon what proposition one believes if one is 
in the business of forming a belief about a subject matter.  
 
4. Steglich-Petersen’s counter (20177) and replies  
Steglich-Petersen makes three points in reply to our previous defence of 
Owens’s objection. Here, we take each in turn and offer a response, before 
making a final point.  
 
4.1 If and only if  
Owens characterized the truth-aim as one in which the truth of p was 
necessary (but not sufficient) for belief that p. This was so as not to attribute to 
believers the aim of believing all true propositions. We noted that Steglich-
Petersen accepts Owens’s characterization of the truth-aim, and eschews the if 
and only if formulation (Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof 2013: p. 454).  
In reply, he claims that it is unclear why we took the if and only if 
conception to be eschewed by him (Steglich-Petersen 2017: p. 4). To this we 
note that if Steglich-Petersen was operating with the if and only if conception 
in his response to Owens, it was dialectically strange to characterize the truth-
aim as Owens does, draw on it, and then fail to note that Owens had not 
characterized it in the right way, and that an alternative conception of the 
truth-aim would be operated with instead. Putting matters of interpretation 
aside though, Steglich-Petersen is now clear that he characterizes the truth-
aim as one which has truth as sufficient for belief that p, but as not being 
vulnerable to the worry raised by Owens. This invulnerability is down to 
believers having the aim with respect to particular propositions, or classes of 
propositions, and not having a general aim of believing all true propositions. 
 Previously we prefigured a way of responding to us which had 
structurally similar features to Steglich-Petersen’s position without talking of 
aims for local sets of propositions. We noted that any move to ‘if and only if’ 
might be meant not ‘as part of an alternative formulation of the truth aim but 
7 Steglich-Petersen 2017: ‘Weighing the Aim of Belief Again’. Logos and Episteme, this issue.  3  
                                                        
rather a description of what the agent is up to—given that it is now settled for 
him or her that he or she will arrive at a belief concerning whether or not the 
proposition is true’ (Sullivan-Bissett and Noordhof 2013: p. 454).  
This conception of the truth-aim must pave a middle way between 
believers aiming to believe all the propositions which are true, and believers 
aiming to have only true beliefs. This middle way is restricted (so as to rule 
out the best avoided truth as sufficient construal), but is more liberal than 
applying only to those propositions subjected to doxastic deliberation (to rule 
out the only if construal). The thought is that the aim kicks in for those 
propositions one considers adopting the truth-aim for, and then, the truth-aim 
can be weighed insofar as it can be discarded if the agent decides not to 
subject the proposition(s) to doxastic deliberation.  
 This conception of the truth-aim might help Steglich-Petersen’s 
position only if it is the same aim which is present in doxastic deliberation, and 
the deliberative context which precedes it. (Later we suggest, contra Steglich-
Petersen, that it is not, see §4.3, and even if it is, that does not yet do the work, 
see §4.4). 
 
4.2 Conditional aims and weighing 
For the sake of argument, Steglich-Petersen grants that the truth-aim is best 
construed in terms of truth as merely necessary for belief. But he says, in cases 
of so-called conditional aims (where one aims to ϕ only if some other condition 
obtains), it is not the case that other aims and considerations cannot be 
weighed against the conditional aim. He gives the example of the aim to go to 
staff meetings only if there will be cake, and suggests that pursuing this aim may 
conflict with one’s other aims (e.g., maintaining good relations with the 
Department Chair), and these other aims are relevant in deliberation over 
whether to adopt the cake-aim.  
This case is not to the point, since it was no part of our claim that 
conditional aims cannot be weighed. We were not taking issue with the 
structure of the truth-aim (its being conditional), but with the examples 
4  
Steglich-Petersen used to demonstrate contexts in which that aim was weighed. 
We do not deny that there can be consideration of whether to adopt 
conditional aims; the truth-aim does indeed share with other conditional aims 
that a context preceding the aim’s adoption can involve deliberation over 
whether to adopt the aim. Nevertheless, there is an important difference 
between the truth-aim and other conditional aims, which, we take it, is the 
basis of Owens’s original concern. With conditional aims, it is possible to 
adopt the aim, the relevant condition for ϕ-ing not be met, and yet ϕ 
nevertheless. If I adopt the aim to go to staff meetings only if there is cake, it is 
possible for me to decide to go even though there is not cake (perhaps the 
meeting is especially important). Or if I adopt the aim to run only if it is sunny, 
it is possible for me to decide to run, even if it is not sunny (perhaps I am 
training for a marathon) (examples can be multiplied). But the analogous 
situation is ruled out in the case of the truth-aim: if I take up the truth-aim for 
some proposition p and enter into deliberation over whether to believe that p, 
once I answer the question whether p in the negative or even fail to answer it 
in the positive (and so the condition for belief is not met), I cannot form the 
belief that p. There is no parallel possibility of going ahead in spite of the 
condition not being met in the case of belief.  
Steglich-Petersen is aware of this feature of belief formation but maintains 
it is still appropriate to characterize it as guided by the aim of truth. But given 
the difference identified, he needs to explain why this difference—not present 
in other cases—does not threaten the substantial use of aim talk here. We give 
reasons for supposing it does below (§4.4).  
 
4.3 Equivocation 
We argued that deliberating over whether to form a belief about p (to adopt the 
truth-aim for p) is not part of the belief-forming process. That if an agent is 
deliberating over whether to be guided by the truth-aim, she is not yet in the 
game of forming a belief. Deliberating over whether to adopt the aim with 
5  
respect to a particular proposition is not a context in which one is already 
being guided by that aim.  
 Steglich-Petersen’s claim is that the truth-aim is present in other 
deliberative contexts, and in some of those (such as whether to adopt that 
aim), the aim can be weighed. He notes that ‘the aim one might take up as a 
result of deliberating whether to pursue the truth aim with respect to some p, 
is the very aim that constrains deliberation over whether to believe that p’ 
(Steglich-Petersen 2017: p. 5). So in the context of deliberating over whether to 
form a belief about p, one is working with the aim of belief (alongside others), in 
a stage prior to the belief-formation process. 
We agree that deliberation on the question whether to form a belief about 
p gives way to practical considerations, and that if the truth-aim were present 
in such deliberation, then it would be weighed (perhaps against 
considerations regarding time or effort). But as we argued previously, 
deliberation over whether to adopt the aim of ϕ-ing takes place in a context prior 
to ϕ-ing, and so does not (perhaps cannot) involve the aim of ϕ-ing itself. That 
is not to say one cannot adopt the aim of ϕ-ing without actually beginning the 
process of ϕ ing (aims can be dropped upon further reflection), but only to say 
that the deliberative context in which one considers whether to adopt the aim to 
ϕ, is not one in which that very aim plays a role.  
Compare deliberating over whether to adopt the aim of running only if it is 
sunny outside. Deliberation over whether to adopt this aim will presumably 
include considerations of time, effort, injury-proneness, and so on. But to say 
that this deliberative context is one in which the running-aim itself plays a role 
is, it seems to us, implausible, and at the very least, in need of argument.  
Here is one way of thinking about the disagreement here. Steglich-
Petersen’s sufficiency truth-aim can be read as a description of what the agent 
is up to once it is settled for her which proposition(s) to subject to doxastic 
deliberation (a point we made previously with respect to the possibility that 
Steglich-Petersen might opt for an if and only if aim (Sullivan-Bissett and 
Noordhof 2013: p. 454)). Suppose that for a set of propositions S1, the agent 
6  
aims to believe that p if and only if p is true. Now we can ask, how is the set itself 
chosen—that is, how does the agent decide to adopt the truth aim for S1 
instead of S2? Say that S1 is a set of propositions about what the weather will 
be like today, and S2 is a set of propositions about which student broke the 
classroom window. Presumably what settles one’s adopting the sufficiency 
truth-aim towards one of these sets is a matter of Owens’s formulation (if you 
are to form beliefs about the propositions in S1 they had better be true), and 
practical considerations. If it is important to my goals to form a true belief 
about what the weather will be like today, and/or if it would be troubling to 
form a true belief about who broke the classroom window, I might decide to 
believe all and only true propositions in S1. But now we see that Steglich-
Peteren’s truth aim is not weighed against anything else, rather what we have 
is Owens’s aim plus practical interests interacting. And this, of course, takes 
place at a stage prior to Steglich-Petersen’s aim playing a role (if it does, see 
§4.4).  
Our original charge was that Steglich-Petersen equivocated between 
deliberating over whether to form a belief about p and deliberating over whether 
to believe that p. He responded by noting that there is no such equivocation, 
that these are indeed different deliberative contexts, but that the truth-aim is 
at work in both of them (and weighed in the former). We replied here that the 
truth-aim is not at play in the context of deliberation over whether to adopt 
that exact aim and towards which proposition(s).  
 
4.4 Weighing simpliciter is not the point 
As a final point, even if the truth aim were being weighed in a context prior to 
that of doxastic deliberation, that hardly shows that belief formation is 
governed by an aim. Rather, all that would be shown is that there is a truth-
aim that can be weighed, and that (perhaps independently) belief formation 
follows rules that enable beliefs to be true. Just because a certain aim is 
weighed in deciding whether to deliberate over p does not mean that that aim 
is adopted in belief formation. It could just be that the process of belief 
7  
formation is such that its outputs are in accordance with the aim. When the 
process of deliberation is going on, the process no longer has the distinctive 
feature of being guided by the aim (after all, we might take guidance by the 
aim to be revealed by its being weighed against other aims). Consider the 
rules of a game. The rules may have been chosen to make the game 
pleasurable. But when one buys in and follows the rules, one does not allow 
pleasure to be weighed against other things. Likewise, on what grounds does 
Steglich-Petersen take bare weighability of the truth-aim in some context to 
support the claim that that aim is what structures the nature of some other 
context, that of belief formation? 
 
5. Conclusions  
We have again defended Owens’s objection to beliefs having aims, this time 
from Steglich-Petersen’s replies to our previous work on this issue. We agreed 
with Steglich-Petersen that the adoption of conditional aims can be preceded 
by deliberation over whether to adopt the aim in question, but argued that—
unlike other conditional aims—one cannot go ahead and believe if the 
condition for believing specified by the aim is not met. One cannot ignore the 
prescription of the aim of belief. Indeed, it is this which motivated Owens’s 
objection in the first place.8  
We argued that if the truth aim is to be characterized as having the 
truth of p as sufficient for belief that p, that aim needs to be present in 
deliberation over whether to take up the truth aim, for there to be a case of the 
aim being weighed. But this is not so; deliberation over whether to adopt the 
aim is prior to deliberation structured by that aim, Steglich-Petersen has 
mistaken the interaction of the only if truth-aim with other interests for the 
weighing of the if and only if truth-aim.  
8 For another explanation of why the prescription of the truth aim cannot be ignored, and 
limits to it, see Noordhof, Paul 2001: ‘Believe What You Want’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society. Vol. 101, pp. 247–65; and Noordhof, Paul 2003: ‘Self-Deception, Interpretation and 
Consciousness’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. LXVII, no. 1, pp. 75–100. 8  
                                                        
Finally, we claimed that even if Steglich-Petersen were right that the 
truth aim is weighed in a context prior to belief formation, that does not show 
that belief formation itself is governed by an aim. 
Thus we claim, again, that Owens’s challenge to the truth-aim 
approach remains to be answered.    
9  
